Historic Senate Hearing on #UAP & #AARO, Dr. Sean Kirkpatrick Testifies #EmergingThreats #Disclosure

The President's FY2023 and FY2024 budget requests for AARO included only enough funding to cover the office's operating expenses, with almost no funds for research and development; it took a letter from Senators Rubio, Gillibrand and 14 other senators to Secretary Austin to secure temporary funding relief for the current fiscal year.

the president's budget for fiscos 23 and 24 requested only enough funding to defay the operating expenses of Arrow. It included almost no funds to sustain the critical research and development necessary.

Our check Confirmed: Senators Rubio and Gillibrand led a February 16, 2023 letter to Deputy Defense Secretary Kathleen Hicks (and the Principal Deputy DNI) warning that the FY2023 budget request covered only AARO's basic operating expenses with no R&D funding, and that the FY2024 request looked similarly inadequate. Fourteen other senators joined Rubio and Gillibrand (16 total), matching the claim's count, and the letter did secure temporary funding relief.

Sources kelly.senate.gov, executivegov.com, gillibrand.senate.gov

During the February 2023 shoot-downs of objects over North America, DoD publicly disclosed that sensor/radar filters were adjusted (opened) to allow detection and tracking of a wider range of objects for the first time.

DoD disclo disclosed that filters on radar systems were adjusted to allow for detection and tracking of diverse sets of objects for the first time.

Former Deputy Secretary of Defense David Norquist stated that if UAP-associated objects had been labeled 'made in China,' there would have been a public and government uproar and a maximal effort to identify them, implying that UFO stigma has muted the actual government/public response.

Had any of these objects had the label made in China, there would be an uproar in the government and media. There would be no stone unturned and no effort spared to find out what we were dealing with.

AARO evolved organizationally from the Navy-led Unidentified Aerial Phenomena Task Force (UAPTF) into the All-domain Anomaly Resolution Office.

your office evolved from the Navyled unidentified aerial phenomena task force to the all domain anomalous resolution office known as Arrow.

AARO's team is made up of more than three dozen experts, organized into four functional areas: operations, scientific research, integrated analysis, and strategic communications.

The Arrow team of more than three dozen experts is organized around four functional areas: operations, scientific research, integrated analysis, and strategic communications.

AARO was established by DoD in July 2022, and as of the April 2023 hearing had been operating for approximately nine months.

the DoD's establishment of the all domain anomaly resolution office in July of last year.

AARO has found no credible evidence to date of extraterrestrial activity, off-world technology, or objects that defy the known laws of physics.

in our research, Arrow has found no credible evidence thus far of extraterrestrial activity, off-world technology, or objects that defy the known laws of physics.

In February 2023 the US shot down a PRC high-altitude surveillance balloon along with three other unidentified objects over North America.

We can look at the recent incursion of the unidentified PRC high altitude balloon for as an example.

About 52% of all UAP reported to AARO are described as round orb/sphere shapes.

Over half, about 52% of what's been reported to us are round orb spheres.

Most AARO-reported UAP sightings occur in the 15,000-25,000 ft altitude range, reflecting where DoD aircraft and sensors operate rather than where UAP activity is necessarily most common.

most of our sightings occur in the 15 to 25,000 ft range. And that is ultimately because that's where a lot of our aircraft are.

AARO's typical reported UAP characteristics: mostly round, 1-4 meters, white/silver/translucent/metallic, altitude 10,000-30,000 ft, apparent velocity stationary to Mach 2, no thermal exhaust usually detected, intermittent radar/radio/thermal signatures.

mostly round mostly 1 to 4 meters white silver translucent metallic 10,000 to 30,000 ft with apparent velocities from stationary to Mach 2. No thermal exhaust usually detected.

The Middle East MQ-9 drone video of an apparent spherical object (via EO sensor) remains an unresolved case due to insufficient data.

It is going to be virtually impossible to fully identify that just based off of that video.

The South Asia MQ-9 case's apparent 'propulsion trail' behind a fast-moving object was a sensor readout/processing artifact (a 'shadow image'), not a real physical trail, and the object itself resolved into the infrared heat signature of a nearby commuter aircraft.

We pulled these apart frame by frame. We were able to demonstrate that that is essentially a readout uh overlap of the image. It's a it's a shadow image, right? It's not real.

As of the hearing (19 April 2023), AARO is tracking over 650 total UAP cases.

So, as of this week, uh we are tracking over total of 650 cases.

AARO's January 2023 public report cited roughly 366 cases, with about half (~150) assessed as likely balloon-like and about two dozen as drones.

the report in January basically said about half of the ones at that time, about 150 were balloon were likely balloon like or something like that.

About half of AARO's roughly 650 cases have been prioritized as showing potentially anomalous/interesting characteristics; of those, roughly 20-30 are about halfway through the five-step analytic process, and only a handful have completed peer review with signed case-closure reports.

I think we we're currently sitting at around if I remember correct, we were around 20 to 30ish are about halfway through that analytic process.

AARO's next quarterly report and its next annual report (moved up by Congress to June/July) will combine a number of outstanding reports into one.

Our next annual report um you all have uh given us uh moved it up to to June July.

Of the small subset of cases showing signatures of advanced technical capability (described as 'single percentages' of the total case population), Kirkpatrick has 'concerning indicators' suggesting some may relate to foreign (Chinese or Russian) capabilities, but no confirmed evidence.

I am concerned about what that nexus is and I indicators that some are related to foreign capabilities.

China is 'on par or ahead' of the US in some emerging technology areas relevant to this threat assessment, and China and Russia are less risk-averse about fielding advancing technical capabilities than the US.

there are emerging capabilities out there that that in many instances Russia and China, well China in particular are on par or ahead of us in some areas, right?

The Navy has officially acknowledged 11 near-miss incidents involving UAP between 2004 and 2021 that required pilot action and follow-up reports.

The Navy's officially acknowledged that between 2004 and 2021 11 near misses occurred involving UAPs that required pilot action and follow-up reports.

The Navy established a formal protocol in 2019 for pilots to report dangerous or anomalous UAP encounters.

in 2019 the Navy established a protocol for pilots to report on their dangerous encounters.

AARO currently operates under Title 10 authorities and states it needs additional authorities for cross-agency collection tasking and counterintelligence work.

There are some authorities that we need. We currently are operating under title 10 authorities but we have um you know good relationships across the other agencies.

A Sidewinder air-to-air missile, of the type fired from an F-22 to shoot down an unidentified object over US airspace, costs close to $500,000 each.

Sidewinders cost us close to half a million dollars each.

AARO's office is administratively located within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security (OUSD I&S), but per the FY2023 NDAA it is not substantively subordinate to that office and instead reports directly to the Deputy Secretary of Defense.

your office is administratively located within the office of the under secretary of defense for intelligence security, but you're not substantively subordinate to the under secretary. Rather, you are a direct report to the deputy secretary.

Our check AARO is administratively a Direct Report Office under OUSD(I&S), but statute requires its Director to report directly to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (and the Principal Deputy DNI), with OUSD(I&S) providing only administrative support, not command authority. This matches the substance of Gillibrand's claim. Note: the specific reporting-chain language traces most directly to the FY23 Intelligence Authorization Act's provisions on AARO rather than being a standalone clause visible in NDAA summaries reviewed; the two acts were passed as a package and the distinction does not change the substantive finding.

Sources ousdi.defense.gov, en.wikipedia.org, congress.gov

As of the hearing, AARO had submitted the first version of its required public-facing safe-disclosure portal for superior approval before Christmas 2022, and had received no response or timeline as of mid-April 2023.

I have uh we submitted the first version of that before Christmas.

AARO has received referrals for and interviewed nearly two dozen witnesses so far under its NDA-safe-disclosure process for UAP witnesses and participants.

We've brought in uh nearly two dozen so far.

During the response to the North American objects incident (February 2023), AARO did not play a decision-making role beyond an initial situational assessment given to Joint Staff leadership; the response decisions themselves were made by the White House.

we did not play a role in what you would respond other than that initial um you know advice on what we are seeing and how we are seeing it.

Roughly half of AARO's staff come from the intelligence community and half from scientific/technical backgrounds; AARO also has liaisons from NASA, FBI, the Air Force Office of Special Investigations (OSI), the military services, and DOE.

The I half of my staff come from the IC. Half of my staff come from uh other scientific and technical backgrounds. I have DOE.

Outside observers had speculated that DoD sensor filters were systematically eliminating unusually fast or slow objects from detection, and this speculation was borne out when DoD acknowledged opening filters during the February 2023 North American incidents.

outside observers has speculated that DoD sets filters on certain sensors to eliminate objects that are moving really fast or slow because what we are looking for militarily are conventional aircraft and missiles.

Kirkpatrick states that 'extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence,' attributing the phrase to Carl Sagan in 1979, and adds his own extension that extraordinary claims also require 'extraordinary science.'

In 1979 Carl Sean said extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence. I would go one step further and I would say extraordinary claims require not only extraordinary evidence but extraordinary science.

NASA's unclassified UAP data study explored whether existing civil sensor platforms (e.g. climate-science satellites) could help detect UAP, but found many such platforms lack sufficient resolution to detect objects in the 1-4 meter size range AARO typically reports.

the resolution of many of the climate science civil um science, you know, civil satellites was much larger than that, which means you'd have a hard time picking out something that's smaller than a pixel.

AARO is exploring public-private partnerships and crowdsourcing as additional future data sources to augment its classified sensor data.

We're exploring public private partnerships ma'am as you know we've talked about in the past to look at is there a way to smartly crowdsource additional data.