Disclosed

Kirsten Gillibrand

Chair, Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities

Claims listed
5
Checked
2 of 5
Video
1
How Kirsten Gillibrand's claims fared when checked

Credentials

Credentials as stated in the videos (not independently checked)

  • US Senator (channel name)
  • Chair of the subcommittee (opens the hearing; addressed as 'madam chair' and 'chairwoman')
  • US Senator (D-NY)
  • Subcommittee Chair

Claims by video

5
  • Supported2:04Official document

    The President's FY2023 and FY2024 budget requests for AARO included only enough funding to cover the office's operating expenses, with almost no funds for research and development; it took a letter from Senators Rubio, Gillibrand and 14 other senators to Secretary Austin to secure temporary funding relief for the current fiscal year.

    the president's budget for fiscos 23 and 24 requested only enough funding to defay the operating expenses of Arrow. It included almost no funds to sustain the critical research and development necessary.

    Our check Confirmed: Senators Rubio and Gillibrand led a February 16, 2023 letter to Deputy Defense Secretary Kathleen Hicks (and the Principal Deputy DNI) warning that the FY2023 budget request covered only AARO's basic operating expenses with no R&D funding, and that the FY2024 request looked similarly inadequate. Fourteen other senators joined Rubio and Gillibrand (16 total), matching the claim's count, and the letter did secure temporary funding relief.

    Sources kelly.senate.gov, executivegov.com, gillibrand.senate.gov

  • Unverified3:05Official document

    During the February 2023 shoot-downs of objects over North America, DoD publicly disclosed that sensor/radar filters were adjusted (opened) to allow detection and tracking of a wider range of objects for the first time.

    DoD disclo disclosed that filters on radar systems were adjusted to allow for detection and tracking of diverse sets of objects for the first time.

  • Unverified3:05Secondhand

    Former Deputy Secretary of Defense David Norquist stated that if UAP-associated objects had been labeled 'made in China,' there would have been a public and government uproar and a maximal effort to identify them, implying that UFO stigma has muted the actual government/public response.

    Had any of these objects had the label made in China, there would be an uproar in the government and media. There would be no stone unturned and no effort spared to find out what we were dealing with.

  • Unverified14:18Official document

    In February 2023 the US shot down a PRC high-altitude surveillance balloon along with three other unidentified objects over North America.

    We can look at the recent incursion of the unidentified PRC high altitude balloon for as an example.

  • Supported42:59Official document

    AARO's office is administratively located within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security (OUSD I&S), but per the FY2023 NDAA it is not substantively subordinate to that office and instead reports directly to the Deputy Secretary of Defense.

    your office is administratively located within the office of the under secretary of defense for intelligence security, but you're not substantively subordinate to the under secretary. Rather, you are a direct report to the deputy secretary.

    Our check AARO is administratively a Direct Report Office under OUSD(I&S), but statute requires its Director to report directly to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (and the Principal Deputy DNI), with OUSD(I&S) providing only administrative support, not command authority. This matches the substance of Gillibrand's claim. Note: the specific reporting-chain language traces most directly to the FY23 Intelligence Authorization Act's provisions on AARO rather than being a standalone clause visible in NDAA summaries reviewed; the two acts were passed as a package and the distinction does not change the substantive finding.

    Sources ousdi.defense.gov, en.wikipedia.org, congress.gov

Their video

1